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Abstract 
We examine which type of assembler－American-type or Japanese-type－will 
occupy a dominant position in a duopoly competition. An American-type 
assembler such as GM produces the parts internally, while a Japanese-type such 
as Toyota purchases them from its affiliated (keiretsu) supplier. This subject is 
also related to an institutional choice of boundaries of the firm, which affects 
firms’ competitiveness. In an affiliated procurement system, it is usual for a 
parent firm to support its affiliated supplier in various ways prior to purchasing 
the parts. The support can work as a commitment device that enables the parent 
firm to purchase the parts at a low price. Subsequently, the low price of the 
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1 Introduction 
Japanese automakers enjoy competitive power in the North American market. 
The competitive power of Japanese automobiles originates from both their 
moderate price and high quality. In fact, it is no exaggeration to say that the 
majority of the competitive power is created by the affiliated supplier. Generally, 
GM produces about 70 percent of the parts used in its cars by itself, while 
Toyota produces only 20-30 percent4. We analyze a theoretical competition 
model in which one firm produces an intermediate good by itself, whereas the 
other procures the intermediate good from its affiliated supplier. 
Much empirical literature has examined the Japanese-American 
subcontracting system, such as Asanuma (1985), Womack et al. (1990), 
Fujimoto (1997), Cusmano and Takeishi (1991), and Nishguchi (1994) and so on. 
They concluded that such a different subcontracting system has exerted great 
influence on the difference in performance between Japanese and American 
automakers. They especially emphasized the importance of a cooperative 
relationship between automakers and suppliers as well as that of the suppliers’ 
skills and abilities in the Japanese subcontracting system, which can be 
contrasted with the arm’s length relationship in the American subcontracting 
system5. However, these studies are no more than comparative analyses to show 
the priority of the Japanese subcontracting system in comparison with the 
American subcontracting system. 
Concretely speaking, much economic literature has devoted focused attention 
to the comparative analysis of the Japanese-American automobile industry. 
However, there has been less focus on the theoretical competition model 
between the different subcontracting systems. Therefore, this paper bridges a 
logical gap in the competition theory between the Japanese and the American 
subcontracting systems. This paper will shed light on the research of this area.  
                                                                          
4 See Womack et al. (1990) for details. However, Chrysler among American automakers 
relatively procures a great deal of parts and components from competitive market. 
5 See Taylor and Wiggins (1997) that contrast the Keiretsu subcontracting system with spot 
transaction procured from the competitive market. 
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The Japanese automakers have maintained the long-term relationships with 
their affiliated suppliers. These long-term relationships enable them to make 
proper relation-specific investments without the hold-up problem 6 . These 
investments are made in both physical assets and intangible skill-and-abilities. 
On the one hand, the skills and abilities of suppliers enable them to implement 
the quality control (QC) of the parts, execute the just-in-time (JIT) delivery, and 
make the value engineering (VE) or value analysis (VA) proposal to the 
assembler7. Japanese manufacturers have provided their suppliers with several 
kinds of supports, which enable them to accumulate and upgrade their 
skill-and-abilities. The resulting high skill-and-abilities of suppliers help them 
to strengthen the automaker’s own competitive power. The supports include 
several pieces of the instruction for quality control, technological advice on cost 
reduction, and financial aid8. These supports can be regarded as a lump sum 
transfer paid by the automaker to the supplier before the transaction is 
implemented. This paper shows that the ex-ante transfer works as a 
commitment device which enables the automaker to purchase the parts at a low 
price. The low price subsequently offers the automaker a competitive advantage 
in the final product market.  
The support from an automaker to a supplier is a typical feature of the 
cooperative relationship in the Keiretsu system. This system is different from 
the spot market procurement between the buyer and the seller is bounded 
within a transaction. The system is also different from the in-house 
procurement where the assembler department is unable to commit itself to 
                                                                          
6 See Klein et al. (1978) and Williamson (1985) for hold-up problem. The repeated 
transactions can be expressed by the repeated game. See Baker et al. (2001) for the 
repeated transactions from a game theory approach. 
7 The supplier is expected to propose ideas for improving the design of parts and 
components at the development phase (VE proposal) and/or at the mass production 
phase (VA proposal). VE and VA mean the value engineering and the value analysis, 
respectively.  
8 From the supplier’s point of view, the transaction with its keiretsu manufacturer is 
not merely to take an order but to secure an opportunity to improve its own skill and 
ability. 
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paying the ex ante transfer to the intermediate department. 
We analyze a three-stage model, which incorporates the features of the 
keiretsu system contrasted with the in-house procurement. At first stage, in 
keiretsu system, the assembler offers the supplier a contract including a price of 
an intermediate good and a lump sum transfer. At second stage, the cost 
reduction investment is executed in both systems, and at the third stage, each 
output of final goods is determined in a duopoly market. The main result is that 
the assembler in the keiretsu system enjoys more output, payoff, and 
investment than those of the assembler in the in-house procurement. The lump 
sum transfer enables the assembler to set a lower price for the intermediate 
good. It makes the manufacturer occupy a dominant position in the Cournot 
competition. 
In a broad sense, this paper relates to the issue of make-or-buy i.e. the 
boundaries of the firm. The decision is associated with transaction costs both 
within and across firms, as authors such as Williamson (1985), Grossman and 
Hart (1986), and Hart and Moore (1990) have considered. Although these 
authors dealt with the make-or-buy decision within one party; we focus on a 
competitive between two parties. Bonnano and Vickers (1988) and Rey and 
Stiglitz (1988) analyzed the issue of make-or-buy from the perspective of 
strategic behavior. They showed that manufacturers mitigated the competition 
by selling their product through their independent retailers (vertical separation) 
rather than directly to consumers (vertical integration).  
A large amount of literature treats forward integration in a similar manner, 
whereas relatively few studies focus on backward integration. Especially, when 
an investment takes place before the associated output is produced, two 
competitive firms may use the investment for strategic purposes other than for 
minimizing costs. Such a strategic use of investment will increase the total 
amount of investment, increase total output, and lower profit. The strategic use 
of investment produces inefficiency in that total costs are not minimized for the 
chosen output (Brander and Spencer, 1983). Taylor and Wiggins (1997) 
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compare two fundamentally different subcontracting systems: the American 
system, which is characterized by competitive procurement, large orders, and 
inspection, and Japanese system, which is specified with repeated purchases 
from a supplier, small orders, no inspection, and supplier’s positive profit. They 
show that although both systems coexist as local solutions, there is a growing 
trend a shift from the American system to the Japanese system. Chen (2005) 
examines whether or not an assembler integrates its parts production. When 
there exists economies of scale through learning-by-doing in the production of 
parts, it is profitable for an integrated firm to sell the parts to the rival firm. The 
rival’s firm may strategically not purchase from an integrated firm unless the 
price of the intermediate good is sufficiently lower than those of alternative 
suppliers. Vertical separation occurs if and only if the total industry profit is 
higher under vertical separation than under integration. Lin (2006) analyzed a 
helping effect for rivals when a downstream firm directly entered into the input 
market. He also showed that separation exclusively occurs if the number of 
downstream firms exceeds a threshold level. 
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe the model. 
In section 3, we obtain the equilibrium of the model. In section 4, we discuss 
some propositions that relate to both firms’ performances. Section 5 contains 
some implications and concluding remarks. 
 
2 The Model 
 Consider two firms, i and j, producing a homogeneous final product. The 
inverse demand function for the final product is given by 
 
p=a-b(qi+qj)                              (1) 
 
where p is the market price, qk (k=i,j) is the output (= sales volume) of firm k, 
and a and b is a positive parameter. Firm i produces an intermediate good for 
the final product internally, whereas assembler jA purchases it from its Keiretsu 
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supplier jS. In the keiretsu procurement, firm jA provides several supports for 
its own keiretsu supplier jS before the transaction between them is implemented. 
For simplicity, the total amounts of the supports are simply given by F.  
Firm i and keiretsu supplier jS are able to make an investment for reducing 
the marginal production cost of the intermediate good prior to producing it. 
When they invest xk(k=i,j) in the cost reduction for the intermediate good, their 
marginal costs are given as ck(xk). Without loss of generality, we assume that the 
marginal cost function is as follow:  
 
ck(0)=c,  ck'<0,  ck'(xk→0)<-∞,  ck">0,  ck(xk→∞)→c             (2) 
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
The last assumption in Eq. (2) means that no matter how they may invest, the 
marginal cost cannot fall under c9. Put another way, some raw materials are 
absolutely required in order to produce the intermediate good. For simplicity, 
one unit of the final product needs exactly one unit of the intermediate 
(fixed-coefficient technology) and the cost of transforming the intermediate 
good into the final product is normalized to zero. We also assume that  
 
2c<a<11c                                                 (3) 
 
The timing of the game is as follows:  
In stage one, firm jA offers to the keiretsu supplier jS a take-it-or-leave-it 
contract that consists of the intermediate good price w(≥0)10 and the lump sum 
pecuniary transfer F. keiretsu supplier jS accepts the contract as long as the 
profit is non-negative under the expected order quantity. It is worth noting that 
                                                                          
9 We surmise that about 20-30 per cent of the marginal cost is saved from investment. 
10 We assume that the contract {w, F} is observable to firm i. 
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w≥0 11 . In stage two, firm i and keiretsu supplier jS determine their cost 
reduction investments xk (k=i,j). Finally, firm i and firm jA choose their output 
levels qk (k=i,j) in stage three. The payment from firm jA to supplier jS is 
transferred according to the initial contract between stage two and three.  
 
3 Analysis 
3.1 The Third Stage 
We focus on the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game. In stage three, firm 
i selects an output level for the final product in order to maximize its profit 
given the output of a rival firm. It is worth noting that firm i produces an 
intermediate good at cost ci, while firm jA procures a unit of intermediate good 
at cost w. Then, firm i's maximization problem is  
 
Max πi=(p-ci)qi-xi=(a-b(qi+qj)-ci)qi-xi,  w.r.t. qi. 
 
From the first-order condition that ∂πi/∂qi=a-2bqi-bqj-ci=0, the reaction 




 Then, firm jA’s maximization problem is 
 
Max πjA=(p-w)qj-F=(a-b(qi+qj)-w)qj-F,  w.r.t. qj. 
 
 
From the first-order condition that ∂πjA/∂qj=a-bqi-2bqj-w=0, the reaction 
function is given by  
                                                                          
11 Suppose that the manufacturer cannot make commitment to its order quantity. When 
w<0, the supplier’s payoff becomes negative owing to the manufacturer’s infinitive order 




The above two reaction functions yield the equilibrium outputs as solutions to 
the third stage 
 
qi(ci,w)=(a+w-2ci)/(3b)                                (4-1) 
qj(ci,w)=(a-2w+ci)/(3b)                                (4-2) 
 
We can also solve the price for the final product by substituting Eq. (4-1) and Eq. 
(4-2) into Eq. (1) as follows: 
 
p(ci,w)=(a+w+ci)/3                                   (4-3) 
 
What is important to note from Eq. (4-1) and Eq. (4-2) is that  
 
qi ⋚ qj  iff  w ⋚ ci                                       (5) 
 
Eq. (4-1) and Eq. (4-2) show how the marginal procurement cost w and 
marginal production cost ci affect their output levels. Concisely speaking, the 
higher the firm i’s marginal cost ci, the greater firm jA’s output qj, and vice versa. 
It is also worth noting from Eq. (4-1) and Eq. (4-3) that  
 
qi>0  ⇔  ci<(a+w)/2  ⇔  p>ci 
qj>0  ⇔  w<(a+ci)/2  ⇔  p>w 
 
The above equations imply that the price of the final product must be higher 
than marginal cost ci and marginal procurement cost w in order to have a 
positive output.  
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3.2 The Second Stage 
In stage two, firm i and keiretsu supplier jS choose the investment level in 
order to maximize their profits. From Eq. (4-1) and Eq. (4-3), firm i's 
maximization problem is 
 
Max πi=(p-ci)qi(ci,w)-xi=(a+w-2ci(xi))2/(9b)-xi,  w.r.t. xi 
 


























                     (6-2) 
 
where ci'=∂ci/∂xi and ci"=∂2ci/∂xi2. We assume that ci">27b/(8qi3) for satisfying 
the second-order condition. Note that firm i’s output qi (ci(xi),w) is independent 





ii −=                                    (6-3) 
 
Note that a>2c≥2ci. Then, Given Eq. (3) and w≥0, Eq. (4-1) produces the 
following conclusions: 
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where cj'=∂cj/∂xj and cj"=∂2cj/∂xj2. Note that Eq. (7-2) is satisfied by Eq. (2) as 





jj −=                                      (7-3) 
 
To see the effect of firm i's investment level xi on firm j’s investment level xj, 
and vice versa, we compare Eq. (6-3) with Eq. (7-3). The investment level xj of 
firm j is negatively affected by firm i’s investment level xi, while the investment 
level xi of firm i is independent of keiretsu supplier jS’s investment level xj. If 
qi=qj, xi>xj12. Therefore, note that firm i makes a more aggressive investment in 
cost reduction than keiretsu supplier jS. The reason why firm i makes a more 
aggressive investment is that it uses the cost reduction investment 
strategically13. However, keiretsu supplier jS does not use the cost reduction 
investment in the strategic purpose. 
                                                                         
Let their investments (xi(w), xj(w)) be the function of intermediate price w. 
To see how change in w affects xi and xj, let us see the total differential of Eq. 
 
12 If qi=qj, ci'=-3/(4qi)>-1/qj=cj'. Hence, from c">0, xi>xj. 
13 See Brander and Spencer (1983) for a detail. Such a strategic use for investment induces 
the firm to overinvest for the chosen output. 
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From Eq. (2) and Eq. (6-2), we reach the following conclusions. 
 
0/D")cc2w-(a'-c/dwdx jiii >+=                      (8-1) 
0<]/D'c'c}")c2c-w+-(a'{2c'[-2c=/dwdx 2ijii
2
ijj +           (8-2) 
 
Eq. (8-1) and Eq. (8-2) imply that the lower the procurement price w is, the 
lesser the firm i’s investment amount xi is, but higher the supplier jS’s 
investment amount xj. 
 
3.3 The First Stage 
We now turn to the first stage of the game. Firm jA chooses intermediate price 
w and pecuniary transfer F to maximize its own profit given two constraint 
conditions that keiretsu supplier jS’s profit and intermediate price w are 
nonnegative . The maximization problem is 
 
F and w    w.r.t.F,-/(9b))c2w-(aMax 2ijA +=π  
        0 wand  0,Fx-)/(3b)c2w-)(ac-(w s.t. jijjS ≥≥++=π  
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Note that the first constraint condition is binding14. Then, the above constrained 
maximization problem can be rewritten as follows: 
 





jA −+−−++=π  
0 w s.t. ≥  
 










      (9-1-1) 




                                    (9-1-2) 
 
The first term of RHS in Eq. (9-1-1) is the direct effect and the second term of 
RHS in Eq. (9-1-1) is the strategic effect based on how the rival’s investment 
amount xi is affected by the change in w. We also assume that the second-order 
condition is satisfied for all domain of w. 
 






                                    (9-2) 
 
If it has satisfied the condition that ∂πjA/∂w(w=0)<015, it is efficient for firm jA 
to set the intermediate price w* at zero. If it has satisfied the condition that 
∂πjA/∂w(w=0)≥0, it is efficient for firm jA to set the intermediate price w*≥0. 
Firm jA also chooses pecuniary transfer F* in order to set keiretsu supplier jS’s 
profit to be zero. Under the equilibrium intermediate price w*, let xi*= xi(w*), 
                                                                          
14 When the first constraint condition is binding, assembler jA obtains the same profit 
as that of the total keiretsu channel. 
15 The condition can be rewritten by (-a-ci+6cj)<-(2a+2ci-3cj)ci'(dxi/dw). 
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ci*=c(xi*), qi*=q(ci*,w*), p*=p(ci*,w*), and πi*=(pi*-ci*)qi*-xi* denote, 
respectively, the equilibrium investment amount, the equilibrium marginal cost, 
the equilibrium output of the final product, the equilibrium price of the final 
product, and the equilibrium profit of firm i. Notation about keiretsu firm is 
treated as the same. 
 
4 Some Propositions 
In this section, we introduce some propositions which relate to the 
performances of both firms. Under the assumption that the subgame perfect 
equilibrium is satisfied, we examine the price determination of the parts of the 
keiretsu firm in stage one. To guarantee a duopoly market existence, we assume 
that 
 
w*}*,max{cp* i>                                       (10) 
 
Proposition 1: In equilibrium, the keiretsu procurement firm jA sets the 




Let us, to begin with, see the corner solution. It is easy to verify that 
w*=0<c≤cj* when w*=0. Next, we consider the interior solution. From Eq. 
(9-1), the equilibrium intermediate price w* should be satisfied with the 
following equation: 
 
0=/dw)'*(dx*)/(9b)}c-3c*+2c*w-{(2a+*)/(9b)+6c*-c*4w-(-a=/dwdπ iijijijA   (11) 
 




0<(p*-w*)+(p*- cj*)=2(a+w*+ ci*)/3-w*- cj*=(2a-w*+2 ci*-3 cj*)/3, 
 
dividing Eq. (11) into (1/3b) and rewriting it yields  
 
∂πjA/∂w=[(cj*-w*)-(p*-cj*)]+ci'*(dxi/dw)[(p*-w*)+(p*-cj*)]=0 
  ⇒   (cj*-w*)=(p*-cj*)-ci'*(dxi/dw)[(p*-w*)+(p*-cj*)]>0 
 
Applying ci'*<0, dxi/dw>0, and Eq. (10), it is obvious that cj*>w*.                           
Q.E.D 
 
Note that keiretsu procurement firm jA sets the efficient lump sum transfer 
F* at the level which makes its supplier profit be zero. The efficient lump sum 
transfer F* can be written  
 
   F*=xj*-(w*-cj*)qj*>0                                     (12) 
 
Eq. (12) implies that firm jA pays its supplier jS a positive lump-sum transfer in 
equilibrium.  
 
Lemma 1: Suppose that w∈[0, (a+c)/2]. There exists any w satisfying that 
xi(w)=xj(w). When xi(w)=xj(w), qj(w)>qi(w)and πj(w)>πi(w), respectively. 
 
Proof) 
If xi(w)=xj(w), ci=cj and ci'=cj'. From Eq. (6-3) and Eq. (7-3), we obtain 
 
ci'=cj'  ⇔ -3/4qi=-1/qj  ⇔  qj=4qi/3>qi 
 
Note that the profit of keiretsu procurement firm jA is the same as the sum of 
keiretsu manufacturer’s and supplier’s profits because the supplier’s profit is 




To get the value of w that satisfies xi(w)=xj(w), rearranging and substituting 
Eq. (4-1) and Eq. (4-2) into Eq. (6-3) and Eq. (7-3), respectively, yields  
 
xi⋚xj  ⇔  w⋛ci(xi)-(a-ci(xi))/10≡w. 
Q.E.D. 
 
On the other hand, under the condition that w=w, Lemma 2 is satisfied. 
 
Lemma 2 : Suppose that w ∈ [0, (a+c)/2]. There exists w such that 
xi(w)=xj(w). If w<w, then xi(w) <xj(w). 
 
Proof) 
Suppose that w=0. Substituting w=0 into Eq. (6-3) and Eq. (7-3) yields 
qi=(a-2ci)/(3b) and qj=(a+ci)/(3b), respectively. Note that 4qi/3<qj for xi<xj. 
Therefore, the condition that xi<xj is given by 
 
4(a-2ci)<3(a+ci) ⇔ a<11ci 
 
Eq. (3) implies a<11c≤11ci. Therefore, the sufficiently small w satisfies 
xi(w)<xj(w). 
Now, suppose that w=(a+ci)/2<(a+c)/2. Substituting w=(a+ci)/2 into Eq. 









Eq. (3) yields 2ci<2c<a. Therefore, the sufficiently large w satisfies xi(w)>xj(w). 
From Eq. (8-1) and Eq. (8-2), as xi(w) is monotone increasing and xj(w) is 
monotone decreasing with respect to w, Lemma 2 is satisfied by intermediate 
value theorem.  
Q.E.D. 
 
[Figure 2 here] 
 
By using Proposition 1 and Lemma 1 and 2, we get the following proposition 
which shows the comparative advantage of the Japanese procurement system. 
 
Proposition 2: Under Eq. (3), the equilibrium profit and output of the firm jA 
as well as the equilibrium investment amount of keiretsu supplier jS is larger 
than those of integrated firm i, that is. xi*<xj*, qi*<qj*, and πi*<πjA*. 
 
Proof) 
To begin with, let us check the corner solution. As w*=0<w, xi*<xj* by 
Proposition 3. If xi*<xj*, ci*>cj*. Proposition 1 and Eq. (5) give us that cj*>w* 





 The above equation means that firm i's profit is monotone increasing in w. 
Meanwhile, if w∈[0, w], ∂πjA/∂w<0 by Eq. (9-2). Because πi(w)<πjA(w) by 
Lemma 1, πi*<πi(w)<πjA(w)=πjA*.  
 
                                                                          
16 Noting Eq. (6-1) gives us that the second-term of RHS in the below equation is zero. 
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[Figure 3 here] 
 
Next, let us check the interior solution. Note that if w=w, xi=xj. Substituting w 
into the first-order condition yields  
 
      ∂πjA/∂w(w=w)=(-a-4w -ci+6cj)/(9b) 
              +{(2a-w +2ci-3cj)/(9b)}ci'(dxi/dw)=0              (13) 
 
where ci=ci(xi(w)). If Eq. (13)<0, w*<w by Eq. (9-2). Noting that when w= w, 
xi=xj and ci=cj. Let us check the sign of Eq. (13) when w=w. To begin with, 




It is worth noting that c(xi)<0 and dxi/dw>0. We also know that the second 
term of Eq. (13) is negative. Accordingly, the sufficient condition that Eq. 
(13)<0 when w=w is that the first term of Eq. (13) should be negative. 




Note that ci=cj and a>cj. The sufficient condition that Eq. (13)<0 when w=w is 
satisfied. As w*<w, we obtain that xj(w*)>xi(w*) and cj*<ci* by Proposition 2. 
We also have the facts that w*<cj* and qj*>qi* by Proposition 1 and Eq. (5), 
respectively. In the end, the fact that πi*<πi(w)<πjA(w)<πjA* is satisfied.  
Q.E.D. 
 




5 Some Implications and Concluding Remarks 
Under the circumstance in which the cost reduction investment occurs before 
the intermediate good is produced, we have analyzed which firm－either the 
internal procurement firm or the keiretsu procurement firm－would have a 
competitive advantage. The main results reveal that the keiretsu procurement 
firm possesses a predominantly competitive advantage in output, cost reduction 
investment, and profit. This can be explained as follows. The keiretsu 
procurement firm is able to acquire two instrument variables by separating its 
input division: one is the intermediate good price and the lump sum transfer. 
Hence, the keiretsu procurement firm can set the price of the intermediate good 
to be lower than the marginal production cost of its affiliated supplier. Such a 
low price of the intermediate good leads the keiretsu procurement firm to 
occupy a predominant position in Cournot competition of the final product 
market. As the price of the intermediate good reduces, the keiretsu procurement 
firm stands at a more predominant position in terms of quantity competition of 
the final product market. On the other hand, the lump sum transfer will 
compensate the supplier’s provisional loss than the marginal production cost. 
Therefore, the pecuniary transfer works as a commitment device which enables 
the assembler to purchase the parts from its supplier at a low price. 
The international competitiveness of Japanese automakers, originating from 
both moderate price and high quality of Japanese automobiles, has been created 
by the cooperative relationship between automaker and supplier as well as the 
supplier’s high skill and ability. According to the study of Fujimoto (1997), such 
a cooperative relationship was established in the 1960s, whereas formerly it was 
an arm’s length transaction. In this period, the Japanese economy was under 
the high growth, and consumer tastes began to get diversified, which compelled 
automakers to produce more volumes and to develop more models. However, as 
they lacked internal resources, they have no choice but to shift to training and 
utilizing the suppliers. In this way, Japanese automakers assisted their suppliers 
in financial, managerial, and technological aspects, by which the cooperative 
 18
relationship was established. Under this relationship, the supplier aggressively 
made investments in terms of relational physical assets and human resources. It 
is worth noting that the automaker’s support to its suppliers plays a role of 
commitment in the transaction to solve the hold-up problem. Therefore, this 
support can be regarded as “hostage” as termed by Williamson (1985). 
On the other hand, American automakers did not conceptualize the idea of 
training the suppliers and making efficient use of their suppliers. The in-house 
procurement is similar to an arm's length transaction procured from the 
competitive market with respect to being independent from the suppliers. Even 
towards the end of the 1980s, American automakers carried out the parts 
development and design by themselves. For instance, GM produced a 
considerable amount of the parts in-house. As long as American automakers 
compete within domestic fringes, the procurement system does not reveal any 
drawbacks. However, once they were faced with competition from Japanese 
automakers, they were outdone in price competition. Although American 
automakers have started introducing and incorporating many aspects of the 
Japanese system into their own, this adoption cannot be deemed as successful. 
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